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In literary studies’ ongoing “return to philology,” few have commented on the 
return’s coincidence with the emergence of media history within the humanistic 
disciplines.1 Perhaps the coincidence is implicit, for philological study has long 
concerned itself not only with tracking the roots of languages but also with 
investigating the meanings and media of verbal expression. Yet it is worth 
making the correspondence between philology and media history more apparent 
as media history becomes prominent in Anglo-American literary studies, a field 
once dominated by hermeneutics. Jerome McGann comes closest to remarking 
on the overlap between philology and media history when he suggests that 
“Philology in a New Key” must attune itself to the digital technologies now 
drastically changing humanistic scholarship and education. In particular, 
McGann argues that we can avoid the utopian hopes and dystopian fears 
attendant to digital humanities by initiating an “imaginative recovery of 
philological method.”2 In one sense, McGann simply balances the optimism and 
angst aroused by digital humanities with what Edward Said lovingly called “the 
least with-it, least sexy, and most unmodern of any of the branches of learning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paul de Man, “The Return to Philology,” in The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986); Lee Patterson, “The Return to Philology,” in The Past and Future of 
Medieval Studies, ed. John van Engen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994); 
Jonathan Culler, “The Return to Philology,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 36 (2002); Edward W. 
Said, “The Return to Philology,” in Humanism and Democratic Criticism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004); Geoffrey Galt Harpham, “Roots, Races, and the Return to Philology,” 
Representations 106 (2009); Martin G. Eisner, “The Return to Philology and the Futures of Literary 
Criticism: Reading the Temporality of Literature in Auerbach, Benjamin, and Dante,” California 
Italian Studies 2 (2011). John Guillory’s “Genesis of the Media Concept” presents a philological 
history of “media” and “medium” in order to “describe the philosophical preconditions of media 
discourse.” Of all these works, Guillory’s is most traditionally philological and most interested in the 
history of “the media concept.” See John Guillory, “Genesis of the Media Concept,” Critical Inquiry 
36 (2010): 321-62 (p. 321). 
2 Jerome McGann, “Philology in a New Key,” Critical Inquiry 39.2 (Winter 2013): 327-46 (p. 328). 
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associated with humanism.”3 Too excited by the new? Return to philology. 
Afraid of the new? Return to philology. More provocatively, McGann’s 
“philological method” implies a mediating dialectic we see throughout recent 
commentary on philology’s return: between the hermeneutic-visionary and the 
descriptively methodological. Digital or not, a return to philology forces literary 
criticism to confront its divide between speculation and empiricism.4 It leads us 
back, in some sense, to the challenge issued by Theodor Adorno in Aesthetic 
Theory that “art is an entity that is not identical with its empiria.”5 But philology 
is also not identical with its empiria. Beyond the empirical method lie the 
concepts that it begets. Hence McGann does not simply call for the recovery of 
philological method. He calls for its “imaginative recovery,” restoring the art 
in philology. 
 
The return to philology is anything but methodical. The scholars currently 
writing about the return to philology hardly practice anything resembling 
philology as it came to prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
that is, either as a discipline now roughly equivalent to historical linguistics or as 
a scholarly methodology roughly equivalent to textual studies. Historical 
linguists and textual scholars still exist, to be sure, but they seldom care to 
rebrand as new philologists.6 Rather, the contemporary return to philology rests 
on the convergence of two fields: media history and hermeneutics, particularly as 
the former bears the weight of historical description and empiricism while the 
latter marks the indeterminacy associated with textual interpretation and literary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Said, “The Return to Philology,” p. 57. Said anchors his philology firmly in humanism and 
conflates philology and humanism over the course of his essay. We can imagine that humanism is 
roughly synonymous with philology when Said concludes his essay: “Humanism… is the means, 
perhaps the consciousness we have for providing that kind of finally antinomian or oppositional 
analysis between the space of words and their various origins and deployments in physical and social 
place, from text to actualized site of either appropriation or resistance, to transmission, to reading and 
interpretation, from private to public, from silence to explication and utterance, and back again… all 
of it occurring in the world, on the ground of daily life and history and hopes, and the search for 
knowledge and justice, and then perhaps also for liberation” (p. 83).  
4 Harpham, “Roots,” pp. 36-7. 
5 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Robert 
Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 335. 
6 Literary critics who most nearly approximate a return to an older philological method tend to have 
some background in textual studies, including Jerome McGann. See, also, Stephen G. Nichols, 
“Introduction: Philology in a Manuscript Culture,” Speculum 65.1 (January 1990): 1-10. 
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theory.7 Bound between material description and literary interpretation, 
philology now occupies a position in the midst of diverging limits. It forms the 
middle ground between the descriptive approaches of textual studies and media 
history on the one hand, and the more revelatory and speculative approaches of 
hermeneutics and textual interpretation on the other. By this account, the return 
to philology revives the foundational tension at the heart of literary studies: 
between the historical-material and the literary-aesthetic. 
 
I propose to examine this tension by comparing the divergent philological 
adaptations of a self-described German media historian and an American poet: 
Friedrich Kittler and Charles Olson. While the most obvious connection between 
these two thinkers is the emphasis each places on the typewriter in the 
development of modern bureaucratic society (Kittler) and postwar poetry 
(Olson), their conceptions of philology in the postwar period prove a more 
incisive correspondence in light of our contemporary return to it. This essay 
develops the correspondence—and attendant contradictions—between the two 
thinkers by considering how both Kittler and Olson theorize philology in relation 
to corpses and literary corpora. The trajectory of Kittler’s work, developed most 
fully in Discourse Networks 1800/1900 (German 1985; English 1990) and 
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (German 1986; English 1999) begins with a 
textual body inhabited by a “pure soul”—later associated with the romantic 
spirit—and ends with that soul turned into a “stinking cadaver.”8 In developing 
this trajectory, Kittler makes a strongly anti-hermeneutic claim that exorcises the 
romantic “spirit” from literary texts—the spirit after which hermeneutics seeks—
and thereby makes texts into material expressions of a broader informational 
discourse network. Kittler’s anti-literary and anti-hermeneutic claims, in turn, 
affect his particular version of philology. Indeed, Kittler praises philology for its 
“mega-technologic” commitment and emphasizes its devotion to describing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For an analysis of the empiricist and positivist approaches attendant to digital humanities 
scholarship, see Tom Eyers, “The Perils of the ‘Digital Humanities’: New Positivisms and the Fate of 
Literary Theory,” Postmodern Culture 23.2 (2013): http://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed 3 October 
2014). While my essay does not assess the role that digital humanities plays in the return to 
philology, Eyers’s distinction between positivism in the digital humanities and speculation in literary 
theory is useful to keep in mind when considering the new philology. 
8 Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800 / 1900, trans. Michael Metteer with Chris Cullens 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 3, 178. 
84	   Affirmations	  2.2	  	  
material technologies of communication.9 For Kittler, philology must sever its 
troublesome ties to hermeneutics so that descriptive media history can found 
itself on philology’s trenchant historical-material basis. Literary texts become 
textual corpora: bodies of information, corpses without souls. The movement 
away from the soul or spirit of the text makes sense in the context of Kittler’s 
historical narrative, and I do not seek to reinsert a “spirit” into literary texts. 
However, Kittler’s “mega-technologic” version of philology forms a 
technocratic overcorrection in his approach to literary corpora, especially as 
textual bodies emerge from the particularities of human work in language.10 In 
Kittler, that is, philology becomes part of a powerful apparatus under which the 
particularities of expression made available by a text are flattened by a mega-
technologic desire to understand literary expression as the effect of a more 
powerful discourse network.  
 
Olson, meanwhile, introduces his first major book-length work, Call Me Ishmael, 
by revisiting the origin story for Melville’s Moby-Dick. In his “First fact as 
prologue” to Call Me Ishmael, Olson retells the story of the whaling ship 
Essex.11 The ship set sail for the Pacific Ocean eleven days after Melville’s birth 
in 1819 and over a year later, on 20 November 1820, had its “bows stove in” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Matthew Griffin, Susanne Herrmann, and Friedrich A. Kittler, “Technologies of Writing: Interview 
with Friedrich A. Kittler,” New Literary History 27.4 (Autumn 1996): 731-42 (p. 732).  
10	  Here I purposefully echo a phrase developed by Edward Said in his book Beginnings: Intention and 
Method. Said writes that “beginning is making or producing difference; but—and here is the great 
fascination in the subject—difference which is the result of combining the already-familiar with the 
fertile novelty of human work in language.” Here the philologically inclined humanist begins to 
distinguish himself from Foucault, whose conception of discourse was influential for Said, but from 
whom Said came to distance himself as he saw Foucault’s discourse allowing too little room for the 
consideration of the particularities of “human work in language,” which is very much a philological 
claim. See Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 
p. xiii. The contradictory stances taken by Kittler and Said make sense here, as Kittler adopted the 
aspect of Foucauldian discourse from which Said distanced himself. For criticism of Kittler’s work 
grounded in the particularities of human interaction with a medium, specifically the gramophone, see 
Lisa Gitelman, Always Already New: Media, History, and the Data of Culture (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2008), pp. 1-25. Gitelman’s approach to media history falls much more in line with Said’s 
philological approach to language, writing, and criticism, which is to say that it emphasizes the 
particularity of media adoption and adaptation in the way a philologist would consider the 
particularity of the development of a word’s use. 
11 Charles Olson, Call Me Ishmael, in Collected Prose, ed. Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 9. 
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when a bull spermaceti whale struck it twice head on.12 The ship’s crew searched 
for land in three whaleboats, but the South American coast they sought was over 
2,000 miles away. Eventually, men began dying from dehydration and starvation, 
and their remaining mates ate them for nourishment. Most importantly for Olson, 
Owen Chase, First Mate and eventual author of the book which inspired Moby-
Dick, resorted to cannibalism in order to survive. Olson paraphrases the event: 
 
It was not until February 8th, when Isaac Cole died in convulsions, that 
Owen Chase was forced, some two weeks later than in the other boats, to 
propose to his two men […] that they should eat of their own flesh. It 
happened to them once, in this way: they separated the limbs from the 
body, and cut all the flesh from the bones, after which they opened the 
body, took out the heart, closed the body again, sewed it up as well as 
they could, and committed it to sea.13  
 
This passage joins Olson’s interest in corpses with their survival in media. Olson 
implies that Chase’s account survives because Chase partook in eating a corpse. 
The point, however, is not simply morbid. By making this “First Fact” a 
prologue to his account of Moby-Dick, Olson proposes that literary histories of 
Melville’s novel must take into account the corpses and literary corpora that 
helped to make the novel possible. Olson discovers the flesh of words: literary 
texts both bear and unbury the dead. 
 
The emphasis each writer places on corpses and literary corpora is particularly 
fitting, as philology is itself a zombie concept in contemporary literary studies. 
Rather than speaking only of a “return to philology,” which places the activity of 
critical thought in the present “returning to,” we should also consider the “return 
of philology,” which emphasizes historical and textual particularities placing 
demands on contemporary thought and accounting. The question of accounting 
becomes central here, for both Kittler’s and Olson’s philological adaptations 
form oblique responses to World War II and the Holocaust.14 Kittler sees the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Charles Olson, Call Me Ishmael, p. 11. 
13 Charles Olson, Call Me Ishmael, p. 13. 
14 Both events had significant effects on philological investigation, with Erich Auerbach writing 
Mimesis in exile from Nazi Germany and then publishing his important “Philology and Weltliteratur” 
shortly after the conclusion of World War II. The Austrian-born philologist Leo Spitzer, too, worked 
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history of German romanticism as partly responsible for the destruction, with 
World War II as the end—result and termination—of romantic ideology and its 
hermeneutic apparatuses. This helps to explain Kittler’s overcorrection to a 
mega-technologic philology. Olson, by comparison, offers an avenue for 
considering media of inscription and transmission that is less terminal than 
Kittler’s conclusions lead us to believe. He envisions philology—and poetry—as 
taking part in an ongoing history which continues to impose itself upon the 
present because it remains partially accessible in media and in language: in 
corpses and corpora past and present.15 To the extent that Olson attends to these 
bodies, his philology—which undertakes both a linguistic and media-historical 
unburying—transposes corpses and literary corpora, what LeRoi Jones once 
called “Olson’s revivification of the dead” in print.16 If philology now functions 
as a zombie concept, returning to us from out of the past, Olson’s philological 
adaptations demonstrate that postwar philology brings corpses with it. Following 
Olson, we should attend scrupulously to these dead and the media that bear them. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in exile. And Edward Said, who came from a Palestinian family with a Christian background and 
who adapted philology for his postwar scholarship, was also deeply influenced by the effects of 
World War II. More recently, the German scholar and theorist Werner Hamacher has tested the 
relationship between WWII and philological thought by responding to Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on 
the Philosophy of History” with his own “95 Theses on Philology.” Hamacher’s theses channel the 
aphoristic style not so much of Martin Luther’s reformative Ninety-Five Theses but of the 
Kabbalistic thinker Gershom Scholem’s “95 Theses on Judaism and Zionism,” which Scholem 
originally compiled in May 1918 and intended to give to the young Walter Benjamin on his birthday. 
When Hamacher writes his own “95 Theses,” meant to echo both Scholem’s and Benjamin’s works, 
he implies that philology remains haunted by the violent history of the twentieth century. We should 
also consider that Benjamin’s Angel of History, who desires to reassemble the pieces of historical 
wreckage thrown down before him, is a figure of philology. See Erich Auerbach, “Philology and 
Weltliteratur,” trans. Maire and Edward Said, Centennial Review 13.1 (Winter 1969): 1-17; Werner 
Hamacher, “95 Theses on Philology,” trans. Catharine Diehl, Diacritics 39.1 (Spring 2009): 25-44.	  
15 In thinking of corpses and literary corpora as markers of both history and presence, Olson falls in 
line here with a conception of philological synchronicity developed by J. Mark Smith in an essay on 
Ezra Pound’s philology. Following Pound’s complicated relationship with philology, Smith writes 
that he works with “an idea of philology, not only as a body of knowledge concerning defunct 
languages, or as an institutionally transmitted and endorsed expertise in the deciphering of such 
languages and the texts in which they survive—but as an archive of historical usage charged with 
synchronic possibility.” Olson, who was profoundly influenced by Pound’s poetry and poetics, senses 
the synchronic possibility made available by a philological approach to language and graphic media. 
See J. Mark Smith, “The Energy of Language(s): What Pound Made of Philology,” ELH 78.4 (Winter 
2011): 769-800 (p. 770). 
16 LeRoi Jones, Raise Race Rays Raze (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 23. 
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Spirit, Corpse, Corpus 
The distinct philological approaches taken by Kittler and Olson hinge upon their 
sometimes converging but often conflicting conceptions of literary texts. Kittler 
opens Discourse Networks 1800/1900 with the provocative assertion that 
“German poetry begins with a sigh.”17 The sigh Kittler refers to is Faust’s, from 
the first line of Goethe’s tragedy: “Habe nun ach! Philosophie […] studiert” 
translated as “Have, oh! studied philosophy.”18 According to Kittler, Faust’s 
sigh—ach! or oh!—inspires German romantic poetry as it marks the analphabetic 
expression of romanticism’s “pure soul.”19 The exclamatory “ach!” manifests the 
inarticulate spirit, the Geist which animates the “Geisteswissenschaften,” or 
human sciences, particularly hermeneutics. The sigh countersigns the 
hermeneutics through which interpretation seeks the spirit of the text. By the end 
of WWII, in Kittler’s historicizing narrative, the “pure soul” has been eliminated 
in favor of textual information (circa 1900) and digital supremacy (circa 1945). 
While Kittler frames the sigh of the pure soul as that which must be exorcised 
from poetry, Olson turns to the breathing body as a source of poetic innovation 
for postwar poetry. “Verse now, 1950,” he writes, “if it is to be of essential use, 
must, I take it, catch up and put into itself certain laws and possibilities of the 
breath, of the breathing of the man who writes as well as of his listenings.”20 
Olson positions “projective” verse against “The NON-Projective,” which he 
characterizes as “‘closed’ verse, that verse which print bred.”21 What Olson 
rejects here—a print-based poetry that remains closed to the world outside of it 
and refuses to project beyond its own status as text—is precisely what Kittler 
praises about literary textuality coming out of WWII. For Kittler, poetry without 
spirit and without meaning marks literature’s concession to data and information. 
For Olson, a poetry open to the breathing body is not coincident with a return of 
the romantic spirit. Rather, projective verse remains open to the linguistic and 
corporeal histories present in human languages in various forms. Olson’s postwar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kittler, Discourse Networks, p. 3. 
18 Kittler, Discourse Networks, p. 3. 
19 Kittler, Discourse Networks, p. 3. 
20 Charles Olson, “Projective Verse,” in Selected Writings of Charles Olson, ed. Robert Creeley (New 
York: New Directions, 1966), p. 15. 
21 Olson, Selected Writings, p. 15. Olson’s projective poetics relies more heavily on forms of graphic 
inscription than he makes clear here. This essay will arrive at that point later. 
88	   Affirmations	  2.2	  	  
poetics thus offers an alternative to the historical narrative Kittler develops thirty 
years later. 
 
Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter—the complementary volume to 
Discourse Networks—opens with a conclusive assertion. “Media determine our 
situation,” he writes, “which—in spite or because of it—deserves a 
description.”22 He arrives at this conclusion through his elaborate description of 
three distinct discourse networks over the course of Discourse Networks and 
Gramophone: 1800, 1900, and 1945. The discourse network of 1800 expressed 
the conjunction of orality and literacy within the burgeoning democratic state and 
marked the convergence of hermeneutics and state power. The figure of 
convergence was the mother, the locus of a “primary orality.”23 Around 1800, 
Kittler argues, primary orality became alphabetic orality through the introduction 
of numerous alphabetic primers into the home and into the mother’s mouth. As 
Kittler puts it, “Pedagogical discourses disappeared into the Mother’s Mouth 
only to reappear multiplied in the form of bureaucratic administration.”24 And 
further, “What Faust called a life source became institutionalized. The mother 
‘must be an educator’ because ‘the child sucks in its first ideas with the mother’s 
milk.’”25 While Kittler distinguishes between the mother’s voice as a life source 
and as an institutionalizing apparatus, he argues that romantic writers such as 
Goethe failed to make any such distinction. As a consequence, romantic writers 
both exacerbated and elided the gendered divide between the idealized Mother, 
whose symbolic power bolstered the Nation,26 and the bureaucratic state which 
required a corps of clerks to administer its power. Kittler consequently connects 
the symbolic power of the mother’s voice (and the romantic spirit) to the 
institutionalization of hermeneutics as an academic discipline. Faust’s 
analphabetic “ach!” found its origin in a universal Mother who guaranteed the 
transcendent spirit of the text; hermeneutics sought that spirit with clerical 
dogmatism. And for Kittler, hermeneutics is clerical in both senses of the word. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael 
Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. xxxix. 
23 Kittler, Discourse Networks, p. 25. 
24 Kittler, Discourse Networks, p. 55. 
25 Kittler, Discourse Networks, p. 55. 
26	  My peculiar capitalizations here follow Kittler and his English translators.	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It upholds the national spirit (clerical transcendence) while strengthening the 
bureaucratic apparatus (the textual laborer, the clerk). 
 
The discourse network of 1900 countered the spirit of the text by means of 
machine recording. The gramophone recorded not only a voice but also the noise 
which surrounded it. The typewriter marked discrete letters on a blank page. 
Kittler taps the white noise from which expression emerged in order to describe 
the spirit’s removal from writing. In a chapter on Nietzsche and his typewriter, 
for instance, Kittler proposes that “Not content or message but the medium itself 
made the Spirit, the corpus composed of German Poetry and German Idealism, 
into a stinking cadaver.”27 The clang and clatter of machine recording drowned 
out the spirit’s poetic sigh: “An inarticulate tone defines the zero point of 
literature, a tone not only inhuman, but also not animal or demonic […] Within 
the realm of all sounds and words, all organisms, white noise appears, the 
incessant and ineradicable background of information. For the very channels 
through which information must pass emit noise.”28 At the zero point of 
literature, the written corpus of the literary text was no longer inhabited by the 
spirit. It became instead the meaningless expression of contemporary modes of 
media inscription.  
 
Still, there was the residue of a former discourse network within this system. 
Texts expressed information and data flows, but the data were forced to “pass 
through the bottleneck of the signifier. Alphabetic monopoly, grammatology.”29 
The discourse network of 1945, which emerged out of World War II, eliminated 
this informational bottleneck with digital expression. War technologies such as 
encryption and Alan Turing’s Universal Machine transformed inscription from 
alphabetic monopoly into digital supremacy. With World War II, Kittler writes, 
“The language of the upper echelons of leadership […] is digitalization; it 
transforms sources of accidental noise into absolute all-or-none organs.”30 Ones 
and zeroes compose the most powerful inscription system, leaving alphabetic 
writing in general, and literature in particular, with little to articulate. Kittler thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Kittler, Discourse Networks, p. 178.	  
28 Kittler, Discourse Networks, p. 183. 
29 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 4. 
30 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, pp. 249-50. 
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concludes Gramophone by contending that “Under the conditions of high 
technology, literature has nothing more to say […] An automated discourse 
analysis has taken command.”31 In this conclusion, literature is a corpse. Digital 
machines decompose its spirit in the “absolute all-or-none organs” of ones and 
zeroes. This is the anti-literary and anti-hermeneutic present Kittler had set out to 
describe from the beginning. Literature has at last shed its romantic ideology and 
now expresses nothing more than an aspect of media history.32 
 
Kittler’s anti-hermeneutic and anti-literary trajectory informs his conception of 
philology, which Kittler considers an antidote to hermeneutics. In his digital 
network of 1945 literature has “nothing more to say,” and so hermeneutics has 
nothing to interpret. David Wellbery offers an overview of Kittler’s antagonism 
toward hermeneutics in his foreword to Discourse Networks in which he remarks 
on the particularly strong tradition of hermeneutics in the German academy. 
Kittler regards the foundations of hermeneutics as untenable in light of its 
sociological and medial history as an academic discipline. According to 
Wellbery, Kittler “tears the veil away from hermeneutics and dispels its aura, its 
shimmering suggestion of sacral authority,” by performing a “genealogy” of 
hermeneutics.33 “Under the optic of genealogical analysis,” he writes, “the 
universality claim of hermeneutics evaporates and hermeneutics is exposed in its 
situational boundedness, its particularity.”34 Kittler undermines the grand claims 
of hermeneutic interpretation by locating hermeneutics within a series of 
materially, historically, and institutionally based media networks.  
 
Wellbery rightly derives Kittler’s method from Nietzschean and Foucauldian 
genealogical analysis. Yet “exposing the situational boundedness” of 
hermeneutics also stems from a different textual and historical methodology that 
is equally rooted in Nietzschean thought and the German critical tradition: 
philology. In an interview with Matthew Griffin and Susanne Herrmann 
published in 1996, Kittler responds to the abandonment of philology in newer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 263.	  
32 For more on Kittler’s antagonism toward literature and preference for historical description, see 
E. Khayyat, “The Humility of Thought: An Interview with Friedrich A. Kittler,” boundary 2 39.3 
(Fall 2012): 7-27 (especially p. 11). 
33 David E. Wellbery, “Foreword,” in Kittler, Discourse Networks, pp. vii-xxiii (p. ix). 
34 Wellbery, “Forward,” pp. ix-x.	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models of literary and cultural studies: “I think we all understand that the 
movement away from the philologic basis can create monstrous problems […] 
There has always been in the philologic disciplines a firm, that means mega-
technologic, basis for work. In cultural studies every canon drifts away. You’re 
essentially free to do what you want, and you have to hope that students also 
have the philologic basis which you yourself bring as a transition figure.”35 A 
follow-up response to a question about sociology reinforces his philological 
emphasis: “Sociology cannot be an ersatz for philology. If you abandon 
philology just because the philologists don’t reflect upon their own medium, you 
don’t necessarily have to abandon the one positive thing about philology, 
namely, its reference to a specific medium.”36 Here Kittler warns against 
abandoning the medium-specific interests of philological investigation. His 
media history takes form not only in genealogical analysis but also as a philology 
shorn of its hermeneutic interests. The “positive thing” about philology, it would 
seem, is its empirical positivism, which frustrates the hermeneutic drive toward 
speculation and interpretation. 
 
Kittler characterizes 1945 as the zero point of literature, when literature has 
nothing left to say. Olson takes that zero point as the point of departure for a 
postwar poetics based in philology. Olson himself emerged as a writer more or 
less directly out of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Office of War Information, for 
which Olson worked resolutely during the war before resigning out of frustration 
with administrative policy. Among his first important artistic companions was 
the Italian artist-in-exile Corrado Cagli, whom Olson met in 1940.37 While Olson 
worked in administration during the war, Cagli joined the American Army and, 
as Ralph Maud reports, was in the artillery unit which liberated the Buchenwald 
concentration camp.38 Cagli documented what he saw at Buchenwald in starkly 
drawn ink on paper. One such sketch depicts an emaciated corpse in a prone 
position in the extreme foreground. The corpse’s face, turned slightly toward the 
viewer, exposes one nearly blacked out eye. The body is splayed across the 
bottom of the drawing with its head on the right side of the image, and has its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Griffin, Herrmann, and Kittler, “Technologies of Writing,” p. 732.   
36 Griffin, Herrmann, and Kittler, “Technologies of Writing,” p. 732. 
37 Ralph Maud, Charles Olson’s Reading: A Biography (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1996), p. 70. 
38 Maud, Charles Olson’s Reading, p. 70. 
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right arm twisted around its back extending up and back at a forty-five degree 
angle into a closed fist. Immediately beyond the fist, another corpse occupies the 
middle ground on the left side of the drawing. This body is more difficult to 
make out, with its torso and head either covered by fabric or obscured in 
sketched abstraction. Yet its supine position with one leg bent and a knee 
pointing skyward distinguishes it as another of the Holocaust dead. I describe 
this picture in detail here, because after Cagli returned to the United States he 
planned two gallery shows that included his Buchenwald sketches. He 
commissioned Olson to write several poems for an accompanying brochure. 
 
Among Olson’s poems for the brochure I focus here on “La Préface” because it 
demonstrates how Olson’s philological interests inform his work between media, 
in this case between drawn and written expression. The critic Sherman Paul has 
called the poem “as important to [Olson’s] work as ‘The Second Coming’ is to 
Yeats’s.”39 Paul’s point is shrewd because the poem forms Olson’s most ardent 
poetic response to the horrors of World War II, just as Yeats engages with the 
destruction of World War I. Most significantly for the purpose of this essay, 
some of Olson’s earliest positions on the relationship between media, philology, 
and visionary poetry originate in this poetic response to drawings of the 
Buchenwald dead. Over the course of the poem Olson’s focus moves from the 
unburied corpses I describe above to a philological and visionary unburying of 
older expressive forms.40 Put differently, the poem progresses from medial 
limitation, through philological process, to a kind of trans-historical poetic 
vision. While such a sequence might sound foreign to those familiar with 
criticism on Olson, particularly the claim that Olson takes interest in a visionary 
poetics, the changes over the course of the poem show how Olson understood 
artful abstraction to emerge from the media-based process poetics for which he 
became most known. Named for the position it held in the gallery show 
brochure, the poem “La Préface” prefaces the poetic theory Olson developed in 
the years following 1946 and shows that Olson’s philological interest in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Sherman Paul, Olson’s Push: Origin, Black Mountain, and Recent American Poetry (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1978), p. 8.	  
40 Michael Davidson has written on Olson’s philological interest in linguistic roots, arguing for 
example that his “desire to antedate modern associations for words such as ‘myth,’ ‘history,’ and 
‘truth,’ in Indo-European roots reflects his attempt to recover physical, material bases at the heart of 
all speech acts.” See Michael Davidson, Ghostlier Demarcations: Modern Poetry and the Material 
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media of poetic expression must also be understood in the context of its 
scrupulous caring for the dead. 
 
Olson’s poem begins amid two confounding allusions: one to the drawings of the 
Buchenwald dead; the other to Dante’s La Vita Nuova,41 a sequence of courtly 
love poems sutured together by sections of prose. “La Préface” begins: 
 
The dead in via 
        in vita nuova 
 in the way.42 
 
The step-like descent begins with Buchenwald’s “dead in via,” a phrase in which 
the dead emerge by way of Cagli’s drawn and Olson’s written lines. Yet “vita 
nuova,” or new life, surfaces within these medial limits as well. Resting 
typographically between or in the middle of “The dead” and poetry’s expressive 
“way”—both horizontally and vertically—“vita nuova” inhabits a middle 
ground: between the limit-marking corpses and the expressive but impeded way 
of the poetic line. More than this, Dante’s book of love poems devoted to 
Beatrice was itself interrupted and haunted by her death. La Vita Nuova 
consequently bore Beatrice in life and death via the expressive means of poetry. 
Olson thus draws on Dante in “La Préface” to propose that poetic expression is 
bound to the ultimate medial limit of the corpse. Yet it also originates in a love 
for the dead that forms of graphic expression bear with them. 
 
It is the task of “La Préface” to bear the dead with it: to carry them in the 
expressive way of the poetic line. Olson takes on this responsibility by giving his 
poem over to the voices of those who died at Buchenwald, incorporating them in 
fragmented sentences. The speaker addresses the dead and receives several 
replies: 
 
You, do not you speak who know not. 
“I will die about April 1st…” going off 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For a reading of La Vita Nuova and its connection to philological survival see Eisner, “The Return 
to Philology.” 
42 Charles Olson, “La Préface,” in Selected Writings, p. 160.	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“I weigh, I think, 80 lbs…” scratch 
“My name is NO RACE” address 
Buchenwald new Altamira cave 
With a nail they drew the object of the hunt.43 
 
Olson’s reference to Buchenwald as a “new Altamira cave”—a space of Upper 
Paleolithic graphic expression—suggests just how cataclysmic an event the 
Holocaust is for Olson’s conception of postwar poetry. The Altamira cave 
paintings, after all, became a touchstone for modernist art and poetry. Hugh 
Kenner reports on the importance of the Altamira images in The Pound Era, 
writing that “Here was a lost visual mode thrust into the present, undimmed. No 
one could begin to imagine how it had felt to draw such things; one could only 
look at the confident lines. Picasso came from Barcelona to Altamira to look at 
them in 1902, at the threshold of a long career of being unabashed by the past. 
Their existence launched Leo Frobenius on a 40-year career as an anthropologist 
to whom African antiquity spoke today. […] In 1919, T. S. Eliot stood in a cave 
in southern France experiencing the revelation that ‘art never improves,’ and 
soon afterwards wrote of how all art enters a simultaneous order.”44 If the 
discovery of the Altamira images gave rise to a sense that “Time folded over; 
now lay flat, transparent, upon not-now”45—a description which recalls J. Mark 
Smith’s more recent conception of the synchronicity operating within 
philological method46—the stakes of poetic accounting changed no less 
dramatically for Charles Olson in light of the Holocaust and the images emerging 
from it. And so Olson gives his poem over to the dead who speak via media, to 
the extent that they can, in the form of Cagli’s sketches and in the more chilling 
forms of inscription Olson imagines from within the Buchenwald camp. Still, 
their scratchings “go off” in ellipses. The fragmented records—stamped with 
anonymity—leave Olson the philological and poetic task of bearing witness to 
what the dead no longer can. 
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46 Smith, “The Energy of Language(s),” p. 770. 
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Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub recognize the vacillating relation between the 
act of witnessing and the media that ultimately bear the account of that act in 
their influential work, Testimony. The book, in which Olson’s “La Préface” 
would have fit very well, addresses texts that were “written and produced 
consequent to the historic trauma of the Second World War, a trauma we 
consider as the watershed of our times and which the book will come to view not 
as an event encapsulated in the past, but as a history which is essentially not 
over, a history whose repercussions are not simply omnipresent […] but whose 
traumatic consequences are still actively evolving.”47 According to Felman and 
Laub, the traumatic omnipresence of World War II eliminates the “too-familiar 
critical accounts of the mutual ‘reflection’ (or ‘representation’) between ‘history’ 
and ‘text.’”48 The denial of the reflective model comes about not only through 
the “contextualization of the text,” but much more critically through the 
“textualization of the context,”49 in which a particular context finds its afterlife in 
the media in which it is “textualized.” 
 
The textualization of context aptly describes the process poetics Olson develops 
in “Projective Verse.” As we saw earlier, Olson proclaims that 
 
Verse now, 1950, if it is to go ahead, if it is to be of essential use, must, I 
take it, catch up and put into itself certain laws and possibilities of the 
breath, of the breathing of the man who writes as well as of his listenings. 
(emphasis added)50 
 
The projective poem works by way of the ear and the breath in order to “catch up 
and put into itself” an endless stream of perceptions: “ONE PERCEPTION 
MUST IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY LEAD TO A FURTHER 
PERCEPTION. […] must must must MOVE, INSTANTER, ON ANOTHER!”51 
Yet for all of Olson’s apparent interest in immediacy, projective verse still 
depends on the poetic line, which 
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and History (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. xiv.	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49 Felman and Laub, Testimony, p. xv. 
50 Olson, “Projective Verse,” p. 15. 
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comes (I swear it) from the breath, from the breathing of the man who 
writes, at the moment that he writes, and thus is, it is here that, the daily 
work, the WORK, gets in, for only he, the man who writes, can declare, at 
every moment, the line its metric and its ending—where its breathing, 
shall come to, termination.52 
 
To put the breathing and listening of the poet “into” the line of poetry not only 
suggests a particularly embodied and oral/aural approach for which Olson is now 
well known.53 It also formalizes the “textualization of context” that Felman and 
Laub understand as necessary to writing in light of the Holocaust. 
 
I look to the textualization of context, then, to propose that Olson’s projective 
line of poetry derives in part—despite his swearing otherwise—from a 
contextual medium different from “the breathing of the man who writes.” The 
projective line also originates in Olson’s response to the drawn Buchenwald 
corpses he addresses in “La Préface.” Although neither the Holocaust nor its 
dead is mentioned by name in “Projective Verse,” one early line in Olson’s 
foundational essay makes its link to “La Préface” apparent. Just after Olson 
famously writes that verse in 1950 has to “put into itself” the “breathing of the 
man who writes as well as of his listenings”—the pithy thesis of the whole piece 
up front—he adds: “(The revolution of the ear, 1910, the trochee’s heave, asks it 
of the younger poets).”54 The meaning of this parenthetical remains obscure 
unless one is familiar with “La Préface.” Ten lines after Olson offers his poem to 
the voices of the dead, he writes: 
 
Draw it thus: (     ) 1910 ( 
It is not obscure. We are the new born, and there are no flowers. 
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Document means there are no flowers 
      and no parenthesis.55 
 
In “Projective Verse,” 1910 marks the year of the “trochee’s heave.” Four years 
earlier in “La Préface,” 1910 refers to the shared birth year of Cagli and Olson, 
and it opens a parenthetical which Olson refuses to close. Yet the “new born” 
sensibility Olson names has two referents: the birth of the infants in 1910, and 
the “vita nuova” emerging amid the Holocaust dead in the poem’s first lines. 
Moreover, in the line “Draw it thus: (     ) 1910 (”, the imperative “draw” refers 
equally to Cagli’s drawings of Buchenwald and Olson’s attempt to draw open a 
postwar poetics. The open parenthetical he forms in “La Préface” marks the 
opening of the poetic field later envisioned in “Projective Verse.” Olson’s 
projective poetics thus results not only from the breathing poet but also from 
Olson’s own attentiveness to corpses and the graphic corpora that bear them. He 
anchors “La Préface” in documentation—document means there are no flowers 
and no closed parentheses—and thereby expresses the material interests of his 
poetic philology. 
 
Corpses and documentation dominate the early sections of the poem; yet the 
poem’s conclusion discloses a philological attentiveness to media which gives 
rise to visionary abstraction. Midway through “La Préface” Olson writes of 
himself and Cagli: “It is the radical, the root, he and I, two bodies / We put our 
hands to these dead.”56 Olson calls up the philological method of digging for 
“roots” as he and Cagli put their hands to “these dead,” the proximal 
demonstrative adjective in “these” intimating that the dead are indeed at hand. 
We find a clarifying repetition of his phrasing here in the Mayan Letters, in 
which Olson expresses his admiration of Mayan glyphs to Robert Creeley: “the 
glyphs never got out of hand (out of media).”57 To put one’s hands to the dead is 
to work via media. However, even in light of his desire to keep postwar writing 
in hand, Olson concludes “La Préface” balanced between medial limitation and 
poetic vision: 
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We are born not of the buried but these unburied dead 
crossed stick, wire-led, Blake Underground 
 
The Babe 
the Howling Babe.58 
 
While Olson appears insistent on keeping poetry in hand, he asserts that he and 
Cagli are in fact born of “these unburied dead.” His media-philological method 
of digging for roots and putting hands to the dead gives rise to the unforeseen 
“vita nuova” in the midst of corporeal limits. “Wire-led” currents engender a 
visionary moment. William Blake emerges from underground, a return of the 
dead poet offset by the birth of a “Howling Babe.” We should not mistake this 
birth for a second coming. Olson’s howling babe results from a philological 
method whereby the vita nuova of the “new born” emerges from the dead in the 
way of poetry’s expressive line. In Olson’s media philology the newly born is 
borne within medial limits. 
 
Philology’s Shudder and Its Postwar Return 
I have directed my analysis of philology in Kittler and Olson by focusing on two 
types of corpora to which both turn their attention: corpses and graphic corpora, 
by which I mean textual bodies that have been written, drawn, or inscribed, 
among other means of graphic expression. The former, morbid emphasis serves 
several purposes; primary among them is to reference the very real corpses to 
which both Kittler’s and Olson’s philology responds: those of World War II and 
the Holocaust. While this essay is not primarily about the Holocaust or World 
War II, it assesses two theorists whose thinking about media and philology were 
greatly affected by their occurrence. For instance, Timothy Brennan writes that 
philology remains “skeptical about romanticism and literary modernism” due to 
the “attractions to supermen, the evacuation of the subject, the calligraphic 
fetishization of writing, the addictions to secrets and enigmas, and so on.”59 In 
turn, Kittler’s attraction to an anti-hermeneutic philology functions as a riposte to 
the horrors to which he sees romantic ideology leading. However, his adaptation 
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of only the mega-technologic aspect of philology—as media history—results in a 
problematically technocratic interest in being silent whereof he cannot speak. 
While Kittler’s method allows him to diagnose the structure of discourse 
networks leading up to World War II, it leaves not only literature but Kittler 
himself with nothing to say in its aftermath. His deathly silence, paradoxically, 
expresses the positivism in his media historical approach. 
 
Charles Olson meanwhile wrote one of his most important early poems, “La 
Préface,” after seeing images of the Buchenwald dead starkly drawn by a close 
friend. Olson turns to these drawings in his poem to put an affectionate hand to 
“these dead.”60 In this, Olson’s attention to media and methodology introduces 
an ethical measure of historical consequence into his approach to both philology 
and poetry. The dead may form an obdurate limit, but they may also remain 
within the still graspable limits of media. In a later poem which also pays heed to 
the dead, Olson writes that 
 
      Limits 
are what any of us 
are inside of.61 
 
Here, Olson finds a limit to the modernist call for the new, just as he repudiates a 
naïve philological desire to find some original “truth of the past.”62 Olson wrote 
to Creeley from among the ancient Mayan ruins that we live in a “second time” 
which has a past but no discoverable origin.63 “[S]econd time” is the time of 
Olson’s postwar poetry—as a philological poetics—turning its interest ever more 
to the media it is “inside of.” Corpses and graphic media thereby function as 
indices of Olson’s own “second”-ness as he looks back, like Benjamin’s angel of 
history, in an attempt to make sense of the history working within his present.  
 
Olson’s artful philology, unlike Kittler’s mega-technologic variety, provides an 
early and ethical response to the devastation of World War II, a response from 
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of California Press, 1983), p. 21. 
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100	   Affirmations	  2.2	  	  
which our current return to philology has much to learn. In “Theories on the 
Origin of Art,” a brief essay in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno writes that “aesthetic 
comportment is to be defined as the capacity to shudder, as if goose bumps were 
the first aesthetic image.”64 Adorno goes on to say that this “shudder in which 
subjectivity stirs without yet being subjectivity is the act of being touched by the 
other. Aesthetic comportment assimilates itself to that other rather than 
subordinating it. Such a constitutive relation of the subject to objectivity in 
aesthetic comportment joins eros and knowledge.”65 Adorno’s aesthetic 
comportment establishes an ethical relation to the other; Olson’s philology 
carries out a similar task. With it, he turns to the dead not to subordinate them to 
his poetry, but to develop in his poetics the “constitutive relation of the subject to 
objectivity,” a phrase which characterizes Olson’s poetic goals in “Projective 
Verse.” Aesthetic comportment shudders as it joins “eros and knowledge.” 
Olson’s philology, in which love (philia) joins with the word (logos), affirms that 
an aesthetic shudder might yet derive from an ethical and undying affection for 
media and for the dead they bear with them. 
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